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 Legislators, advocates, and business interests are proposing 
federal privacy legislation with new urgency.  The United States has 
a long-established federal framework for addressing commercial 
privacy concerns, including general consumer protection law and 
sector-specific legislation.  But the calls to expand or replace this 
approach have grown louder since Europe’s General Data Protec-
tion Regulation went into effect and since California adopted de-
tailed and prescriptive privacy legislation. 
 Should we create a U.S. federal privacy law, and if so, how?  
When considering any kind of privacy regulation, three concepts are 
fundamental.  First, no one can control all information about them.  
Second, all privacy laws are government-enforced constraints on 
how one party can use information about another party.  Third, 
over-restricting the use of information about individuals can harm 
individuals by limiting beneficial innovation. 
 This Article defines privacy as the combined effect of two differ-
ent types of constraints on information: perception and use.  When 
 
 * Neil Chilson is a lawyer, computer scientist, and senior research fellow for tech and innovation 
at the Charles Koch Institute.  He guides CKI’s ongoing efforts to understand and promote the legal 
and cultural frameworks that best enable people to discover, innovate, and improve all of our lives.  
Before joining CKI, he was Chief Technologist at the Federal Trade Commission and an attorney 
advisor to acting FTC Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen.  This Article originally appeared on the web-
site of the Federalist Society’s Regulatory Transparency Project. 
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perception constraints are weakened, privacy debates ensue about 
how to restore privacy, presumably by replacing those weakening 
perception constraints with use constraints.  Different kinds of con-
straints can be used to protect online privacy, including technology, 
social norms, private agreements, common law, and legislation. 
 Six principles can guide policymakers in choosing among these 
constraints.  These principles are to: maximize permissionlessness, 
avoid data ownership metaphors, distinguish between privacy and 
data security, focus on uses that injure consumers, clarify FTC au-
thority, and avoid giving the FTC broad rulemaking authority. 
 In short, we should prefer case-by-case enforcement frame-
works where company practices are judged based on consumer out-
comes.  Such frameworks serve consumers better than do detailed 
legislation and prescriptive mandatory privacy practices.  Out-
come-based case-by-case enforcement approaches better resolve 
real consumer injuries, while maintaining the information flows that 
ultimately benefit consumers and preserving the permissionless en-
vironment that has made the U.S. a leader in online innovation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Legislators, advocates, and business interests are proposing federal pri-
vacy legislation with new urgency.1  The United States has a long-established 
federal framework for addressing commercial privacy concerns, including 
general consumer protection laws and legislation for specific sectors, such as 
health care or financial services.2  But the calls to expand or replace this ap-
proach have grown louder since Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation 
went into effect and since California adopted detailed and prescriptive privacy 
legislation.3 
So, do we need federal privacy legislation, and if so, what should it look 
like? 
I believe three often-overlooked concepts can help us answer these ques-
tions.  First, for practical reasons, no one can control all information about 
them.4  Second, all privacy laws are government-enforced restrictions on how 
one party can use information about another party.5  Third, over-restricting 
 
 1. See, e.g., Examining Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer Data Privacy Before the S. 
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2019/12/ex-
amining-legislative-proposals-to-protect-consumer-data-privacy (discussing separate legislative draft 
proposals by the Committee Chairman and a Ranking Member, among others); Press Release, Ron 
Wyden, U.S. Senator for Or., Wyden Releases Discussion Draft of Legislation to Provide Real Pro-
tections for Americans’ Privacy, (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/ 
wyden-releases-discussion-draft-of-legislation-to-provide-real-protections-for-americans-privacy; 
Wendy Davis, AT&T Calls for National Privacy Law, DIGITAL NEWS DAILY (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/327984/att-calls-for-national-privacy-law.html (ar-
guing for various types of privacy legislation); Harper Neidig, Advocates Draw Battle Lines on Na-
tional Privacy Law, HILL (Nov. 13, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/416341-advocates-
draw-battle-lines-over-national-privacy-law. 
 2. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585–86 (2014). 
 3. Jennifer Huddleston, The Problem of Patchwork Privacy, BRIDGE (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/problem-patchwork-privacy (discussing the issues 
arising from a multitude of state privacy laws). 
 4. See CESAR HIDALGO, WHY INFORMATION GROWS: THE EVOLUTION OF ORDER, FROM ATOMS 
TO ECONOMIES xix (2018) (describing information as the arrangement of physical things, which is 
why “[i]t is the only thing we produce”); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 589–99 (explaining the 
history of federal privacy laws).  
 5. See Press Release, Ron Wyden, supra note 1 (detailing ways in which corporations exploit 
users’ data); see also Carole Piovesan, How Privacy Laws Are Changing to Protect Personal Infor-
mation, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/04/05/how-pri-
vacy-laws-are-changing-to-protect-personal-information; Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–32 (1913) (explaining legal rights 
as a constraint on others’ actions). 
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the use of information about individuals can harm individuals by limiting ben-
eficial innovation.6 
Taking these concepts into account, I argue that we should prefer case-
by-case enforcement frameworks where company practices are judged based 
on consumer outcomes.  Such frameworks serve consumers better than de-
tailed legislation and prescriptive mandatory privacy practices.  Outcome-
based case-by-case enforcement approaches better resolve real consumer in-
juries while maintaining the information flows that ultimately benefit consum-
ers.7 
In the following pages, I will first explain what information is and then 
define privacy as the result of a combination of two different types of con-
straints on information: perception and use.  I argue that privacy policy issues 
arise when advocates seek to impose use constraints where information faces 
weakened perception constraints.  I then describe the different constraints 
available to protect online privacy, and their strengths and weaknesses.  Ulti-
mately, I offer six recommendations for how the United States can address 
privacy concerns through government action while preserving the permission-
less environment that has made the United States a leader in online innovation.  
In short, I argue that federal legislation should enhance the ability of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) to address harmful, unfair, or deceptive uses of 
information about consumers. 
II. WHAT IS INFORMATION? 
Information, abstractly defined, is the content of a signal or signals that 
conveys something about the state of the world.8  The signal could be light 
reflecting off an object, soundwaves coming off an object, light or electrons 
moving through a conduit, or any other change in the physical world that can 
 
 6. See Neidig, supra note 1 (highlighting the harm of over-restricting individuals’ privacy); see 
also ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., A GRAND BARGAIN 
ON DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION FOR AMERICA, (2019), http://www2.itif.org/2019-grand-bargain-pri-
vacy.pdf. 
 7. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 666–67 (discussing the necessary balance between 
access to information and privacy protection). 
 8. C. E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 (3) BELL SYS. TECH. J. 379, 
379–423 (1948) (distinguishing between signal and information).  Shannon acknowledges that infor-
mation conveyed thus often has meaning, although such meaning is irrelevant to his particular engi-
neering problem.  Id. at 379. 
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be sensed.9  Signals can carry information enabling the receiver to determine 
something about the state of the transmitter.10 
As physical beings in a physical world, information flows off us con-
stantly and we cannot control all of it.11  As we interact with our environment, 
our interactions change the state of the world.  These changes create signals 
that can often be observed, directly or indirectly, by others.  We cannot halt 
or fully control this information flow unless we stop interacting with reality.12  
In fact, actions to control information flows themselves generate information.  
To be able to fully control these flows would require godlike ability to control 
reality, including how others perceive it.  If you somehow were able to elim-
inate the information flowing off you, you would quite literally disappear 
from the universe. 
III. WHAT IS PRIVACY? 
Privacy is a complicated concept which many people have attempted to 
define, often in conflicting or incompatible ways.13  For the purposes of this 
paper, and building upon my definition of information, I define privacy as the 
result of a limitation on the collection or use of information.  More specifi-
cally, a person has a degree of privacy when certain information—“private” 
information—about that person cannot be perceived or used by another en-
tity.14  Defined thus, privacy is a concept that only makes sense with respect 
 
 9. Id. at 380 (providing examples of information submitted through signals); see also Peter 
Kinget, The World is Analog, CIRCUIT CELLULAR (2014), http://www.ee.columbia.edu/~kinget/ 
WhyAnalog/circuitcellar_The_World_Is_Analog_201410.pdf. 
 10. Shannon, supra note 8, at 379.  Note that “transmission” need not be intentional.  There is no 
intentionality in the transmission of the light that enables us to see the world around us. 
 11. HIDALGO, supra note 4, at xix (describing information as the arrangement of physical things, 
which is why “[i]t is the only thing we produce”). 
 12. Id.; see also The Neuroscience of Decision Making, BRAINFACTS.ORG (Aug. 1, 2011), 
https://www.brainfacts.org/archives/2011/the-neuroscience-of-decision-making.  At the level of neu-
rons, even purely mental effort still affects physical reality, although we generally lack the technical 
means to sense such signals or fully understand their meaning.  Id. 
 13. Adam Thierer, Are Benefit-Cost Analysis and Privacy Protection Efforts Incompatible?, in 
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 561, 564 (Evan Selinger et al. eds., 2018) (“Le-
gal scholars have observed that attempts to define privacy are ‘notoriously contentious’ and can 
quickly become a ‘conceptual jungle.’”); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1–8 
(2008) (discussing the multitude of privacy definitions and describing privacy as “a concept in disar-
ray”). 
 14. See Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line Territorial Pri-
vacy, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 130 (2005).   
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to at least one other party.15  Thus, we can think of privacy as the relative state 
of a system having three components: Entity A, information about Entity A, 
and Entity B.  The less information about A that B can perceive or use, the 
more privacy A has from B. 
This broad, descriptive definition lacks the specificity of some other def-
initions.16  But abstractly describing a state of privacy highlights some im-
portant principles that might be missed if one jumps directly to delineating the 
boundaries of privacy rights or privacy harms.17  In particular, the distinction 
between the perception of information and the use of information is im-
portant.18  We can better understand the genesis and resolution of privacy de-
bates if we understand the difference between constraints on perceiving infor-
mation and constraints on using information, and how these different 
constraints interact with new technology.19 
A. Perception Constraints 
One type of information constraint—a “perception constraint”—exists 
when B cannot even perceive certain information about A.20  This can occur 
when B cannot perceive the signal carrying information, as when a closed 
door hides A from view.  In other instances, even though B might be able to 
perceive the signal, B cannot extract the information carried in the signal.  For 
example, B might be able to see a skyscraper many blocks away, but with her 
unaided eye, cannot see into the windows of A’s apartment in that skyscraper, 
even though the light reflected from A’s apartment reaches B’s eye.  Percep-
tion constraints rely on the world’s physical properties to block observers 
from accessing information.21 
 
 15. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 429 (1980) (noting that 
certain common-sense scenarios make sense only if “the amount of information others have about an 
individual is considered at least partly determinative of the degree of privacy he has”).  
 16. See Benoliel, supra note 14, at 127–28; Gavison, supra note 15, at 424 (explaining “privacy” 
is a term with many meanings). 
 17. See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 S.M.U. L. REV. 1605, 1605–06 (2007) (dis-
cussing non-obvious privacy principles and the different constraints of information). 
 18. Id. at 1607. 
 19. Id. at 1607–08 (discussing the differences between structural constraints and latent structural 
constraints, and their interactions with technology). 
 20. Id. at 1606 n.3, 1607, 1612 (discussing a similar concept he calls “latent structural con-
straints”). 
 21. Surden, supra note 17, at 1607; see also Jamuna D. Kelley, Computer with a View: Progress, 
Privacy and Google, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 187, 188 (2008) (“Physical protections are the logistical 
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In the physical world most of our privacy relies on such perception con-
straints.22  Although there are massive amounts of information streaming off 
us in the physical world, other people face practical limits on their ability to 
capture such information.  And most such signals quickly dissipate below the 
sensing threshold—the slight temperature increase I might cause when walk-
ing through a room, for example, will not linger long.23 
We learn at a very early age that there are limits to our own control over 
information flows in the physical world.  For example, because we cannot 
directly control the light that reflects off our bodies, we wear clothes, build 
doors, and install blinds to physically block such signals.  Used this way, 
clothes, doors, and blinds become technological barriers to information flows. 
On the other hand, much of human progress has been due to scientists and 
innovators removing barriers to information flows so that we can better un-
derstand and connect with the world around us.24  Devices like microscopes 
and telescopes enable us to gather information from signals we could not pre-
viously detect.25  Cameras allow us to share a representation of a scene with 
others who are not physically present.  Communications networks enable us 
to speak to others far beyond the distance our voices can carry.26  Each of 
 
obstacles that prevent society from gathering information about an individual, such as locked doors or 
password-protected hard drives.”). 
 22. See Richard Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (1978) (“Doors, 
private apartments, unattached single-family houses, and private automobiles facilitate privacy in the 
less tangible senses of seclusion or secrecy.”). 
 23. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 321 (2002); cf. Kelley, supra note 21, at 194 (“Furthermore, 
the fact that Street View publicizes moments in time that might otherwise go completely unnoticed 
also contradicts Google’s position that Street View reveals nothing more than does a stroll around 
town.”). 
 24. See HIDALGO, supra note 4, at xx (“[I]t is the accumulation of information and of our ability 
to process information that defines the arrow of growth encompassing the physical, the biological, the 
social, and the economic, and which extends from the origin of the universe to our modern economy.”); 
NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE U.S. WORKFORCE 
(2017), https://www.nap.edu/24649 (reviewing how technological innovations transform aspects of 
society). 
 25. See Tomkovicz, supra note 23, at 320–21; Lawrence Kaiser Marks, Telescopes, Binoculars, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 379, 379–80 (1982) (examining “the reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard as applied to evidence obtained through telescope and binocular sur-
veillance,” and “suggest[ing] that police use of telescopes and binoculars to observe activities or ob-
jects unobservable from a proper location by the ‘naked eye’ violates an individual’s expectation of 
privacy”). 
 26. See Craig Timberg, A Flaw in the Design, WASH. POST (May 30, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/05/30/net-of-insecurity-part-1/?utm_term=.0c866 
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these technologies expand our ability to perceive information about the world 
around us, including information about other people.27 
B. Use Constraints 
Sometimes it is not possible, practical, or desirable to stop other people’s 
perception of information about us.28  In these cases, social norms, private 
rules, and law often constrain how others can use the information they 
gather.29  Thus, B may perceive information about A, but social pressure, pri-
vate agreements, or government commands restrict how B can use that infor-
mation.30  Use constraints can vary in degree, from complete bans on any use 
to broad allowance of uses except for certain restricted uses.31 
Perception constraints rely on natural properties of physics or mathemat-
ics to control information flows.32  In contrast, use constraints control infor-
mation flows based on the strength of the underlying social norms, or the abil-
ities of private or government enforcers.33 
C. The Privacy Challenge 
Every privacy policy debate is over whether and how use constraints 
should supplement perception constraints.34  Such debates often erupt when a 
new technology increases the amount of information available, usually by 
 
3583583 [http://wapo.st/1J9UYJy] (examining the historical development of the Internet, which “al-
lowed virtually any computer network in the world to communicate directly with any other, no matter 
what hardware, software or underlying computer language the systems used”). 
 27. See Tomkovicz, supra note 23, at 320–21.  
 28. See ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 69–70 (rev. and expanded ed. 2016) (arguing that the 
growing concerns over privacy should not curtail data collection because “innovative services, de-
vices, and applications might be lost in the future”). 
 29. Id. (describing how social norms evolved after the introduction of the camera). 
 30. See Surden, supra note 17, at 1610. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Kelley, supra note 21, at 188. 
 33. See Jisuk-Woo & Jae-Hyup Lee, The Limitations of Information Privacy in the Network Envi-
ronment, 7 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2006) (explaining that the general policy “in the United 
States has placed heavy reliance on individuals policing their own records and protecting their own 
information from unintended use” (citing James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Infor-
mation Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003))). 
 34. See David Annecharico, Online Transactions: Squaring the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Privacy 
Provisions with the FTC Fair Information Practice Principles, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 637, 640 (2002). 
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generating entirely new types of information, but also by weakening or elim-
inating certain perception constraints.35  Those debates often resolve as indi-
viduals and society adapt to the change, including at times by adopting new 
perception or use constraints.36 
Consider the advent of popular portable cameras in the late 1800s, which 
made it possible and common to capture permanent information about indi-
viduals in public places.37  This new technology prompted calls for legal pri-
vacy protections in the United States.38  But laws are only one type of tool to 
control information flow.39  Although people had concerns, they also saw 
many benefits, and society adapted to this new technology.40  Individuals 
learned what to expect from photographs and photographers, and how to mit-
igate or avoid photos.41  People developed social norms and private rules about 
where and how cameras may be used.42  And the legal system adopted com-
mon law torts and, in some cases, statutes to prevent or remedy harms caused 
by the technology.43 
Privacy debates are increasingly frequent today because the physical and 
online worlds have very different perception constraints.44  Because humans 
 
 35. See Surden, supra note 17, at 1608. 
 36. See DANIEL CASTRO & ALAN MCQUINN, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., THE PRIVACY 
PANIC CYCLE: A GUIDE TO PUBLIC FEARS ABOUT NEW TECHNOLOGIES 5–6, 25 (2015), http://www2. 
itif.org/2015-privacy-panic.pdf (urging lawmakers to consider how society adapts over time when de-
ciding whether to regulate new technology). 
 37. Id. at 2 (describing the initial panic over privacy concerns with the portable Kodak camera); 
see also Original Kodak Camera, Serial No. 540, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST. (last visited Feb. 26, 
2020), https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_760118 (discussing the inven-
tion of the Kodak portable camera). 
 38. See Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) 
(arguing that common law protects a right to privacy in the wake of the popularization of the portable 
camera). 
 39. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting 
Social Norms, YALE L.J. & TECH. 59, 75 (2013) (noting that individuals choose what to share). 
 40. See CASTRO & MCQUINN, supra note 36, at 2 (explaining how people were aghast at the idea 
of taking public photos in the early 1900s, yet everyone now carries a powerful camera in their pocket). 
 41. See id. at 12 (discussing the bans implemented against cameras at beaches and the Washington 
monument).  
 42. Id. at 2; see also Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 39, at 71–72 (noting how people adjusted their 
expectations and norms after cellphones with cameras became widely used in gym locker rooms). 
 43. See Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 
CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703–04 (1990) (describing the adoption of common law torts protecting privacy 
as a result of the Warren and Brandeis article). 
 44. See BROOKE AUXIER ET. AL, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, 
CONFUSED AND FEELING LACK OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 12–15 (Nov. 15, 
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have deep experiences with the physical world, we generally have accurate 
intuitions about how to block others’ perception of information about us (e.g., 
close the door, whisper to your friend), and generally understand the vulnera-
bilities of such barriers.45 
But the Internet has always had fewer and weaker perception constraints 
than the physical world, by design and by necessity.46  Online interactions can 
be tracked and stored much more efficiently and effectively than physical in-
teractions.47  Indeed, digital communications are so powerful precisely be-
cause they are easy to observe, collect, store, and use in a relatively compre-
hensive manner.48 
Thus, as individuals increase their activities in this new online space 
where information is more observable, recordable, and usable, the relative 
lack of perception constraints creates new privacy challenges.49  Furthermore, 
 
2019) https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-
confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/  (providing empirical research 
about Americans’ concerns and fears about online privacy); Emily Steel, Protecting Offline Privacy, 
WALL STREET J. (Nov. 19, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704533904574
543400320693232 (overviewing how policymakers and consumer advocates worry about digital com-
panies’ use of consumer data to sell and market products). 
 45. See Jonathan Shaw, Exposed: The Erosion of Privacy in the Internet Era, HARV. MAG. 38 
(2009), http://www.harvardmag.com/pdf/2009/09-pdfs/0909-38.pdf (Internet has eroded many of the 
essential aspects of privacy); cf. CASTRO & MCQUINN, supra note 36, at 3 (analyzing the privacy panic 
cycle and finding that the general public panics when a new technology emerges because the public 
understands little about the technology and “privacy fundamentalists” exaggerate the privacy issues 
of the technology). 
 46. See TCP Definition, LINUX INFO. PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/tcp.html (last visited Feb. 26, 
2020) (explaining the transmission control protocol, a trait of the digital world).  As a system dedicated 
to accurately transferring information, the Internet is designed to avoid information degradation that 
occurs in the physical world.  Id. (“[Fundamental Internet protocol] TCP uses error correction and data 
stream control techniques to ensure that packets to arrive at their intended destinations uncorrupted 
and in the correct sequence, thereby making the point-to-point connection virtually error-free.”); see 
also Timberg, supra note 26 (describing how the Internet “developed into a communication system 
that operated mostly in the clear—meaning anyone with access to the network could monitor trans-
missions”). 
 47. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING 1–5 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/documents/reports/cross-device-tracking-federal-trade-commission-staff-report-january-
2017/ftc_cross-device_tracking_report_1-23-17.pdf (describing online tracking technologies). 
 48. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 39, at 84; Shaw, supra note 45 (“People can collect data 
and never throw anything away.  Policies on data sharing are not very good, and the result is that data 
tend to flow around and get linked to other data.”). 
 49. Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 
290–91 (2003) (arguing that digital technology makes past legal conceptions of privacy difficult to 
enforce). 
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as “Internet of Things” technologies increase the number of online sensors, 
more of the previously offline world will be digitally legible.50  This will be 
extremely beneficial, and will enable software-driven solutions to address a 
wider range of real-world problems.51  But it also reduces perception con-
straints in a way that some find unsettling.52 
In response to these technology changes, many seek to impose new use 
constraints on Internet information flows.53  This is the policy challenge we 
face today.54 
IV. TOOLS TO PROTECT PRIVACY 
How might we address this challenge?55  There are many kinds of percep-
tion and use constraints, including several I have already mentioned.56  Let’s 
take a deeper look at the various tools that are available to protect online pri-
vacy. 
 
 50. Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and 
Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2014). 
 51. The Sensor-Based Economy, WIRED, https://www.wired.com/brandlab/2017/01/sensor-based-
economy/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (describing how new sensors and Internet-connected devices 
will proliferate and become common to individuals’ daily routines). 
 52. See AUXIER ET. AL, supra note 44, at 2 (“Some 81% of the public say that the potential risks 
they face because of data collection by companies outweighs the benefits, and . . . a majority of Amer-
icans report being concerned about the way their data is being used by companies (79%) or the gov-
ernment (64%).”); see also Amadou Diallo, Do Smart Devices Need Regulation? FTC Examines In-
ternet of Things, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2013/11/23/ft
c-regulation-internet-of-things/#772ddb838015 (discussing how Internet-connected devices offer 
convenience but raise privacy issues).  But see CASTRO & MCQUINN, supra note 36, at 7 (noting that 
the practice of entering credit card information into a computer spread quickly once people understood 
that it produced a lower risk of fraud than physical use of the credit card). 
 53. See Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits, 
66 STAN. L. REV. 49, 52 (2013) (“If we intend for our economic and legal frameworks to shift from 
data collection to use, it is essential to begin the conversation about what sort of uses we want to take 
off the table.”); Cristiano Lima, A Cornucopia of Privacy Proposals, POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2019, 10:00 
A.M.), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-tech/2019/11/27/a-cornucopia-of-privacy-pro-
posals-783154 (describing dueling Senate privacy bills). 
 54. See Jerome, supra note 53; Lima, supra note 53; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 39, at 73. 
 55. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 39, at 73 (implying that social norms might be a better tool 
than the law to impose use constraints).  
 56. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.  
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A. Technological Tools 
Self-help software tools could help control information flows online, sim-
ilarly to how doors, clothes, and blinds help control information flows in the 
physical world.57  If effective, such online perception constraints would be 
preferable to almost any other approach.58  They would be self-executing, cho-
sen by users, and would provide feedback into the information ecosystem that 
would maximize consumer autonomy—allowing those who want to protect 
information to do so without impeding others’ desire to share.59 
Encryption technologies are the best online analog to privacy-protecting 
physical barriers.60  These technologies enable us to safely transmit sensitive 
information in financial and other transactions.61  Encrypting information 
helps ensure that only the intended recipient will receive that information.62  
Other examples of online perception constraints include tools such as ad 
blockers and VPNs.63 
However, technology-driven perception constraints cannot address all 
privacy concerns.64  Consumers willingly engage in online transactions that 
generate information.65  Indeed, in many cases a service requires information 
to operate.66  If encryption is analogous to window blinds that prevent a 
 
 57. See Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing, 
36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 440–45 (2013).  
 58. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 39, at 92–93 (describing the “significant challenges in 
providing easy-to-use tools that give users meaningful control without interfering with their use of the 
web” (citation omitted)); Thierer, supra note 57, at 445. 
 59. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 39, at 84–85 (providing examples of popular services that 
provide users with the opportunity to balance autonomy and privacy); Thierer, supra note 57, at 445. 
 60. Vindu Goel, Encryption Is More Important, and Easier, Than Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2015, 
4:35 P.M.), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/encryption-is-more-important-and-easier-
than-ever/.  
 61. Id. (“[E]ncryption essentially creates a private connection . . . an unencrypted connection also 
opens the possibility of a hacker[] . . . steal[ing] personal information.”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See generally FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR 
PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015) (outlining other technological tools including obfuscation techniques).  
Obfuscation techniques have strengths and weaknesses of their own.  Id. at 92–93; see also Neil Chil-
son, Hiding in Plain Sight, 34 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 88 (2018) (reviewing BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, 
supra). 
 64. See Thierer, supra note 57, at 454–55. 
 65. Id. at 431–32 (“[I]nformation wants to be free . . . .”). 
 66. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/si
tes/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-
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stranger on the sidewalk from observing me in my house, most online inter-
actions are more like inviting a guest inside.67  We invite guests inside specif-
ically so that the doors and blinds won’t stop us from communicating.68  But 
once the guest is inside (or when we’re directly communicating with an online 
service), we can no longer use those perception constraints to restrict infor-
mation flows.69 
B. Evolving Social Norms 
Social norms also control information flows.70  Society adapts to new 
technology over time, creating new norms around its use.71  As individuals 
use a new technology, they can evaluate the results as well as consider any 
criticism or praise from others.72  This feedback loop organically generates a 
shared sense across members of a community about the proper and improper 
uses of a technology.73 
Consider, for example, how social norms around Caller ID evolved.74  
When it first launched, many considered it a privacy invasion for the phone 
company to share your number with the person you were calling.75  Some 
 
era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.  For example, ordering from online re-
tailers requires providing your shipping address and payment information.  Id. at 44.  Privacy concerns 
about information inherent to a transaction usually revolve around unexpected uses or sharing with 
third parties.  Id. at 26–27, 47 (recommending that “companies should limit data collection to that 
which is consistent with the context of a particular transaction or the consumer’s relationship with the 
business” and that uses inconsistent with what a consumer might expect should be accompanied by 
additional disclosure). 
 67. Id. at 7–8 (articulating the harm caused by intrusive data collection practices). 
 68. See Louis Menand, Why Do We Care So Much About Privacy?, NEW YORKER (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-much-about-privacy (high-
lighting the contrast that we “store more in the cloud than in lockboxes,” and thus we trade the effi-
ciency of operating online for “a society whose citizens have nowhere to hide”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Thierer, supra note 28, at 74. 
 71. Id.; see also Adam Thierer, Privacy and Security Implications of the Internet of Things, 1, 5–
8 (June 1, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273031 (providing examples of social adaption to six dif-
ferent technologies and a description of how norms can regulate use). 
 72. See Thierer, supra note 28, at 74–77.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 70.  
 75. States News Service, ‘Caller ID’ Stirs Debate on Phone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1990), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/nyregion/caller-id-stirs-debate-on-phone-privacy.html 
[https://nyti.ms/29uyuJa] (describing a wide range of privacy concerns with Caller ID). 
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states even regulated it.76  Today, many people consider Caller ID—which is 
a standard feature on every mobile phone—to be an improvement to their pri-
vacy because it allows them to screen calls, and many people won’t answer 
calls from numbers they don’t recognize.77 
Such norms can restrict behavior even when perception constraints are 
removed.78  Returning to the house guest analogy, it is primarily manners and 
other norms that constrain snooping by guests, although hosts might also lock 
away specific, sensitive items.79 
C. Private Agreements 
Two parties might also address concerns about information flows by 
agreeing how such information will be used.80  These agreements can take 
many forms and, unlike regulation, can be specifically tailored to the needs of 
the parties.81  Such agreements could be formal contracts enforceable by either 
party under standard contract law.82  They could be pledges to comply with 
industry standards or self-regulatory standards, with those pledges enforced 
by the industry or the self-regulatory body.83  Or the agreements could be im-
plied or explicit promises in advertising or other documents to the consumer.84 
 
 76. Laurie Thomas Lee, U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Policy and Caller ID, 30 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 1, 5–7 (1993) (discussing the history of government regulation around Caller ID). 
 77. See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 118 (2014); see also Thierer, supra 
note 28, at 70. 
 78. Thierer, supra note 28, at 74–77 (stating that social norms are “the grammar of society”). 
 79. Id. (noting that Edmund Burke stated that “[m]anners are more important than laws” in shaping 
behavior). 
 80. Id. at 123–24. 
 81. Steven A. Bibas, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 
609 (1994). 
 82. Id. at 605–08. 
 83. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Council of Better Bus. Bureaus to Nat’l Telecomm. & Info. 
Admin. on Developing the Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/cbbb_comment_to_ntia_on_consumer_privacy_-
_11.09.18.pdf (describing three privacy-related self-regulatory programs run by the BBB). 
 84. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech Before the Hudson 
Institute: The Government’s Role in Privacy (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/public_statements/governments-role-privacy-getting-it-right/121016govern-
mentrole.pdf.  These types of “agreements” are more likely to be enforced by government consumer 
protection agencies.  Id. (describing how the FTC can and has brought cases against companies that 
break their promises to consumers). 
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D. Legal Remedies 
Thus far, the remedies to privacy concerns I have discussed involve only 
private parties.  Legal remedies add another entity—government.85  When one 
party can legitimately force another party to act in a specific way, we say the 
first party has a legal right.86  All rights imply the power to force another to 
act, or to not act.87 
People disagree over how to define privacy rights.88  In the United States, 
for commercial uses of data, our privacy rights are generally operationalized 
as a consumer protection right to not be harmed by the collection or use of 
information about us.89  In Europe, privacy rights focus instead on protecting 
individuals’ decisions about how information about them is collected and 
used.90  As such, the U.S. and the EU use different legal tools to advance these 
different goals.91  And these are just two of many differing goals that are often 
described as privacy.92 
Even if one settles on a specific privacy goal, there are a variety of legal 
 
 85. See, e.g., Ohlhausen, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining how the Federal Trade Commission, a 
government agency, “often uses its deception authority in cases where a company makes a represen-
tation to consumers about the collection and/or use of their personal data but it fails to keep that prom-
ise and consumer injury results”); see Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach 
to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 681 (1987). 
 86. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 154, 155 (1995) (dis-
cussing the legal right to privacy); see also Zeigler, supra note 85, at 665. 
 87. See Ziegler, supra note 85, at 678–80; see also ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 86, at 155. 
 88. Judith Jarvis Tomson, The Right To Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 295 (1975) (“Perhaps 
the most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what 
it is.”); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Colin Koopman & Nick Doty, Privacy Is an Essentially Con-
tested Concept: A Multi-Dimensional Analytic for Mapping Privacy, 374 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. A 1, 
1 (2016), https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsta.2016.0118 (describing privacy 
rights as an essentially contested concept that cannot be resolved but can be productively explored). 
 89. Mark MacCarthy, Privacy Is Not A Property Right In Personal Information, FORBES (Nov. 2, 
2018, 12:36 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2018/11/02/privacy-is-not-a-prop-
erty-right-in-personal-information/#5873a902280f (arguing against treating online privacy as a prop-
erty right). 
 90. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot & Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The European Un-
ion General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 
66, 76 (2019) (describing the conditions and approach laid out by the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Rules). 
 91. Id. (discussing the U.S. and EU approaches to privacy); see also Comparison of European and 
American Privacy Law, HIPAA J. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.hipaajournal.com/comparison-of-eu-
ropean-and-american-privacy-law/. 
 92. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 479 (2006) 
(discussing the various definitions of privacy). 
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designs one might use to advance that goal.  These can be divided into two 
general categories, common law and legislation, although a continuum exists 
between the two.93 
1.  Common Law 
Common law is characterized by a judge’s or other neutral deci-
sionmaker’s application of general principles to individual situations.94  Each 
case a judge hears and decides subsequently informs future cases.95  Each de-
cision in a case also helps the public understand what behaviors and situations 
are likely to violate the law.96  The law therefore evolves incrementally 
through private litigation or government enforcement in specific cases.97 
The United States provides most consumer privacy protections through a 
common-law-like enforcement system.98  When commercial actions cause 
 
 93. See Simon Dawes, Press Freedom, Privacy and the Public Sphere, 15 JOURNALISM STUD. 17, 
19 (2014) (discussing common law and legislation as two approaches for providing “remedies for 
breaches of privacy”).  
 94. See Arthur L. Corbin, What is the Common Law?, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 73, 75 (1912). 
 95. See Morris L. Cohen, The Common Law in the American Legal System: The Challenge of 
Conceptual Research, 81 L. LIBR. J. 13, 23 (explaining that doctrines of precedent are one of “the 
main features of common law in America”).  
 96. Corbin, supra note 94, at 75; see, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Public Decisions as Public Goods, 79 
J. POL. ECON. 913, 913 (explaining that a judge’s decision in a case “is a direct generation of exter-
nalities by him—the externalities falling on the participants in the case” and that “[i]n addition to these 
rather restricted externalities, he . . . participat[es] in the production of a public good: law enforce-
ment”). 
 97. See Cohen, supra note 95, at 20 (explaining that jurisdictions respond to “the common law by 
charter, subsequent legislation, or constitutional provision”). 
 98. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 585 (discussing the FTC’s role in “polic[ing] unfair and 
deceptive trade practices” since the late 1990s); see, e.g., Charles M. Horn, Financial Services Privacy 
at the Start of the 21st Century: A Conceptual Perspective, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 89 (2001).  The U.S. 
does have specific legislation for certain segments of the data ecosystem.  Id. at 93–94, 100.  For 
example, the health industry is governed by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; 
the financial industry by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; and data about children by the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act.  See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106–
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6506 (1998).  The U.S. also provides citizens with rights vis-à-vis the government use of information 
under the Fourth Amendment and certain statutes.  Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. 
Jones: Does Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 137–38 (2012) (discussing 
Fourth Amendment privacy protection from the government); see also Harold J. Kent, Of Diaries and 
Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 71 n.109 (1995) 
(“Additional statutes limit what the government can do with information generated under its direc-
tives.”).  In addition, there is also private enforcement under several common law or statutory torts.  
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privacy problems, the FTC brings cases to address those problems.99  In fact, 
the FTC has brought more than 500 privacy- and data security-related cases.100  
Most of the FTC’s privacy cases are based on its authority to stop unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.101  That means the FTC holds companies to their 
privacy promises, serving as a backstop to private agreements.102  The FTC 
has also brought unfairness cases where consumers are substantially injured, 
could not have reasonably avoided the injury, and their injury isn’t out-
weighed by benefits to consumers or competition.103  The FTC further details 
its deception and unfairness enforcement through several “soft law” mecha-
nisms such as guidance documents, reports, and letters.104 
2.  Legislation 
The most prescriptive approach is the statutory or legislative approach, in 
which a governing body sets forth detailed rules.105  These rules are specific 
 
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 587 (discussing statutory law and common law torts concerning 
privacy). 
 99. See Letter from Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Vera Jourova, Comm’r, 
Justice, Consumers & Gender Equality, European Comm’n (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/sys-
tem/files/documents/public_statements/927423/160229ftc_privacyshieldletter.pdf [hereinafter 
Ramirez Letter]; see also Ohlhausen, supra note 84, at 2 (“In the areas of privacy and data security, 
the Commission most often uses its deception authority in cases where a company makes a represen-
tation to consumers about the collection and/or use of their personal data but it fails to keep that prom-
ise and consumer injury results.”). 
 100. Ramirez Letter, supra note 99. 
 101. See Olhausen, supra note 84, at 2 (discussing the FTC’s deception authority). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (“[T]he Commission’s unfairness authority . . . focuses on the consumer harm that an act 
or practice may cause.  The Commission’s unfairness statement requires that for the Commission to 
find an act or practice unfair the harm it causes must be substantial, it must not be outweighed by an 
offsetting consumer or competitive benefits, and the consumer could not have reasonably avoided 
harm.”). 
 104. See Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Huddleston Skees & Adam Thierer, Soft Law for Hard Prob-
lems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 37, 44 
(2018) (discussing the FTC and “soft law”). 
 105. See Orin S. Kerr, The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 1117, 1124 (2017); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Infor-
mation Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 485, 495 (2013) (“Fifty years of federal legislative interest in privacy has resulted in one 
commonly recognized and often lamented fact: American privacy law is extraordinarily piece-
meal . . . ‘it is unusual in the United States to find any comprehensive privacy laws.’”).  
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to the problem being tackled.106  They often are focused on a single industry.107  
Such rules often set forth exacting obligations, responsibilities, and standards 
for judging compliance, and punishments and remedies for non-compli-
ance.108  Once established, legislative rules can be difficult to change even if 
circumstances, such as new technology, require change.109  At best, this rigid-
ity creates ambiguity, and at worst, roadblocks to innovation.110  Legislation 
can also entrench incumbent companies and business models, giving them a 
regulatory advantage over would-be competitors.111 
The EU has taken a legislative approach to privacy, most recently in its 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).112  The GDPR focuses on pro-
tecting the judgment of individuals on how information about them should be 
collected and used.113  The GDPR creates specific and detailed legal obliga-
tions that commercial data collectors and processors must follow.114  The 
 
 106. See Murphy, supra note 105, at 495 (explaining that U.S. legislation “largely relie[s] on inde-
pendent enactments tailored to particular sectors or interests”). 
 107. Id. at 496 (explaining that “[t]he word ‘patch-work’ is often used to describe . . . statutory pro-
tections” because they are tailored to specific issues without “a single guiding principle or theory”). 
 108. See Kerr, supra note 105, at 1153–54; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative 
History Tell Us?, 66 CHI. KENT L. REV. 441, 447 (1990). 
 109. See Kerr, supra note 105, at 1155; PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 174 (1995) 
(explaining that “issues were placed on the congressional agenda in response to technological changes 
perceived as threatening privacy” and yet, “the issues were on the congressional agenda for years, if 
not decades, before Congress passed legislation”).  
 110. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Drexler, Privacy in Financial Services: “A Hard Rain’s Gonna Fall”, 
18 DEL. L. 9, 11–12 (2000); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up 
with Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 239, 239 (2007) (“It is often stated that 
the law lags behind technology.  As technology changes and creates new possibilities, lawyers and 
legal scholars struggle to deal with the implications.”).  
 111.  See Moses, supra note 110, at 274 (“Thus, while it may be possible to avoid discriminating 
among known technologies, it will not always be possible to avoid discriminating against future, un-
known technologies.”). 
 112. What Is GDPR?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020); see 
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 90, at 71 (discussing the EU’s approach to privacy). 
 113. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 90, at 77 (explaining that the GDPR’s “purpose limitation 
principle entails that personal data should only be collected for a purpose that is specified in advance, 
and that those data should not be used for incompatible purposes”); General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR), EUROPEAN CAMPUS CARD ASS’N, https://ecca.eu/index.php/news/180-general-data-
protection-regulation-gdpr (last visited Feb. 26, 2020).  
 114. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 90, at 85, 88 (“The GDPR reaffirms the role of the data con-
troller as the party responsible for the data, and imposes stricter controls, duties, and even liability on 
processors . . . these responsibilities require controllers and processors to document compliance, non-
compliance, and failures in the form of data breaches.”); EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE GDPR: NEW 
OPPORTUNITIES, NEW OBLIGATIONS 1, 8 (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/data-
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GDPR restricts what companies can do with information about users, includ-
ing how they can collect information.115  The GDPR also specifies what users 
can force companies to do with information about them.116  (Interestingly, EU 
residents have less protection from data use by their own government than 
United States residents.)117 
The above categories often form a set of overlapping constraints on infor-
mation.118  Cultural norms, private agreements, and soft law will continue to 
affect behavior, with or without legislation.  Furthermore, general privacy 
principles that have built up over time through common law, case-by-case 
evaluations are sometimes codified into specific rules.  And privacy legisla-
tion still requires enforcement against violators, the results of which often re-
quire judges to interpret the rules in a way that affects future enforcement and 
popular understanding. 
V. CRITERIA FOR PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
Building on the framework established above, below are six key recom-
mendations for those considering legislative privacy proposals. 
Preserve permissionless approaches to the maximum extent possi-
ble.119  Historically, market-tested technological innovation has been the most 
successful means to advance consumer welfare.120  And, as discussed earlier, 
 
protection-factsheet-sme-obligations_en.pdf (highlighting the obligations companies have under the 
GDPR).   
 115. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 90, at 79 (explaining the six legal justifications for processing 
personal data). 
 116. GDPR Compliance Checklist for US Companies, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/compliance-
checklist-us-companies/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (specifying the conditions that American compa-
nies must follow when operating in the EU and handling individuals’ personal data). 
 117. Peter Swire & DeBrae Kennedy-Mayo, How Both the EU and the U.S. Are “Stricter” Than 
Each Other for the Privacy of Government Requests for Information, 66 EMORY L.J. 617, 619 (2017) 
(discussing how American privacy laws provide greater privacy protection against government actors 
than do European privacy laws). 
 118. See GDPR Compliance Checklist for US Companies, supra note 116 (describing the EU’s 
GDPR restrictions on United States companies operating inside the EU); see also MacCarthy, supra 
note 89 (describing privacy rights for commercial uses of data in the United States).   
 119. See Adam Thierer, Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation, CATO INST. (Nov. 17, 
2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/cato-online-forum/embracing-culture-permissionless-inno-
vation (“[I]f there was one thing every policymaker could do to help advance long-term growth, it is 
to first commit themselves to advancing [permissionless innovation].”). 
 120. See generally DEIRDRE MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS EQUALITY: HOW IDEAS, NOT CAPITAL OR 
INSTITUTIONS, ENRICHED THE WORLD xxxiv (2016) (describing the significant impact technological 
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much of technological innovation has been the result of removing barriers to 
information flows so that we can better understand and connect with the world 
around us.  Thus, all else being equal, we ought to prefer privacy approaches 
that permit greater information flows and more innovation.121  And in any 
case, we ought to consider the impact of any approach on innovation.122 
We can best compare the different privacy approaches’ effects on inno-
vation by estimating where they fall on the spectrum between perfectly per-
missionless and perfectly permissioned.123  A permissionless approach is one 
where the developer of the product or service does not have to seek permis-
sion, certification, or other authorization.124  Regulators evaluate the service 
by the outcome or likely outcome, not by the process used to produce the re-
sult.125 
By contrast, a permissioned approach is one where innovators must seek 
and receive government approval to pursue an innovation, or where the gov-
ernment sets out a specific process that innovators must follow.126  If a com-
pany fails to follow the specified procedures, it may be found to violate the 
law even if its practices benefit consumers.127  Furthermore, a company that 
follows the specified procedure can escape liability even if consumers are in-
jured.128 
Permissionless approaches enable a wider range of potential innovations, 
including completely unforeseen approaches.129  Permissioned approaches 
narrow innovation options, often requiring innovators to fit a new service into 
a pre-existing framework and established processes.130  This narrowing does 
the greatest harm in fields where innovation would otherwise be rapid, 
 
innovation has on the development of modern society). 
 121. See Thierer, supra note 28, at 33. 
 122. Id. at 20. 
 123. See Thierer, supra note 119 (describing the significance of a permissionless innovation system 
promoted by the government). 
 124. Id.  For an expanded definition of “permissionless” versus “permissioned” approaches, see id.  
In that article, Thierer distinguishes between precautionary and permissionless regulatory approaches 
and describes how a permissionless approach drove enormous innovation in the U.S. information tech-
nology sector.  Id. 
 125. See Thierer, supra note 28, at 87. 
 126. Id. at 106.  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 14, 122. 
 129. Id. at 9, 106 (describing the freedom of creativity that stems from permissionless innovation).  
 130. Id. at 28, 106 (defining the precautionary principle). 
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unpredictable, and disruptive.131 
The types of tools that could address privacy concerns rank from “most 
permissionless” to “least permissionless” as follows132: 
• technological change 
• social norms 
• private contracts 
• soft law 
• common law 
• legislation 
Again, many of these restrictions overlap and interact.133  For example, 
some legislative actions are more permissionless than others, depending on 
how much space they leave or create for higher-level solutions.134  The FTC 
Act Section 5 unfairness and deception standard, for example, was legislation 
that created a common law and soft law approach and provides an enforce-
ment backstop for private agreements.135 
Avoid approaches or language that reinforce the idea that consumers 
own all data about them.136  The ownership/property metaphor does not work 
well for much information about a consumer—such as their interaction with 
a company website, their path through a retail store, or their conversation with 
a clerk.137  In such cases, the information, if “owned” at all, is arguably jointly 
 
 131. Id. at 26, 34 (contrasting the precautionary principle’s structured and control-centered ap-
proach against permissionless innovation’s rapid and unpredictable approach). 
 132. Id. at 107. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. (finding guidance documents as a more permissionless leaning legislative action as 
opposed to censorship, information suppression, and product bans, which are more precautionary). 
 135. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 619, 626. 
 136. See J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Privacy and Consumer Control 1–11 (George 
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 19–27, 2019), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=3449242. 
 137. Larry Downes, A Rational Response to the Privacy “Crisis,” CATO INST. (Jan. 7, 2013), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/rational-response-privacy-crisis (arguing that treat-
ing jointly created information as the property of one party would create inherent issues).  
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or publicly owned.138  Assigning sole ownership rights to jointly produced or 
public information is inefficient, impractical, and in tension with the First 
Amendment rights of others.139 
Maintain a clear distinction between privacy and data security.140  
These are very different problems that need different solutions.141  In many 
ways, data security is the narrower and simpler problem.142  For example, peo-
ple generally agree that we do not want consumer information lost or stolen 
in a breach, although people disagree over how to best avoid or deter that 
negative outcome.143  But in privacy, there isn’t an outcome that everyone 
agrees is good or bad.144  There is no universally-agreed-upon ideal world.  
Some believe consumers will be better off with minimal data collection even 
if it means banning or restricting certain business models.145  Others believe 
consumers will be better off if companies have broad freedom to collect and 
use data.146  To best tackle these problems, privacy and data security ought to 
 
 138. See id.  
 139. Bambauer, supra note 77, at 118; Beales & Muris, supra note 136, at 1–5 (arguing against 
property rights for personal information.). 
 140. See The Difference Between Security and Privacy and Why it Matters to Your Program, 
HIV.GOV (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.hiv.gov/blog/difference-between-security-and-privacy-and-
why-it-matters-your-program.   
 141. See Rick Robinson, Data Privacy vs. Data Protection, IPSWITCH (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://blog.ipswitch.com/data-privacy-vs-data-protection (“In a nutshell, data protection is about se-
curing data against unauthorized access.  Data privacy is about authorized access—who has it and who 
defines it.”). 
 142. See id. (explaining that data security is the protection one puts in place to protect against others’ 
unauthorized access of data while data privacy is more broadly concerned with the extent to which the 
public can access data). 
 143. See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options At All: The Fight for Control of Per-
sonal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1057–60 (1999); see also Robinson, supra note 141 (“The 
only mode of protection that personal data in transit (not in an armored car) can rely on is encryption, 
[but] . . . many protection officers in the file transfer security community would tell you that it is a 
privacy security risk.”). 
 144. See Robinson, supra note 141 (“With end-to-end encryption, however, the only ‘authorized 
users’ . . . with known IP addresses can get through the privacy shield and gain access to the data.  
That’s about as far as technology’s services can provide you when it comes to data privacy vs. data 
protection.”). 
 145. Online Tracking and Behavioral Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. 
https://epic.org/privacy/consumer/online-tracking/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2020) (arguing that current 
online tracking practices allow companies to gather unnecessary amounts of data on consumers and 
exploit them for information). 
 146. Alan McQuinn, The Detractors are Wrong, Online Ads Add Value, INFO. TECH. & 
INNOVATION FOUND. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://itif.org/publications/2016/12/08/detractors-are-wrong-
online-ads-add-value (discussing how online tracking benefits consumers in multiple ways). 
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be addressed separately.147 
Focus on regulating uses that injure consumers, rather than on re-
stricting collection.148  Preventing consumer injury is the proper goal of pri-
vacy legislation, and legislation should directly pursue that goal.149  Legisla-
tion should set general expectations for outcomes followed by active 
enforcement.150  This ends-oriented approach better preserves permissionless 
innovation because companies can try something novel and unanticipated, 
provided they are willing to face consequences—including making consumers 
whole—if things go wrong.151 
Focusing on consumer injury also better addresses the cases where sensi-
tive inferences, drawn from non-sensitive data, are used to a consumer’s det-
riment.152 
Legislation should generally avoid regulating collection practices.153  Col-
lection itself, unless done deceptively, does not harm consumers.154  Indeed, 
much data cannot benefit consumers unless it is collected.155  Access and col-
lection rights, if adopted at all, ought to be limited to the narrow set of sensi-
tive uses where tangible consumer injury is more likely, such as credit or 
 
 147. See Mark E. Heckman, The Difference Between Data Security and Privacy, U.S. 
CYBERSECURITY MAG. (2017) (“Without a clear understanding of the difference, data security and 
privacy is often conflated in ambiguous and imprecise policies.”). 
 148. See Mark MacCarthy, It’s Time For A Uniform National Privacy Law, CIO (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.cio.com/article/3300106/it-s-time-for-a-uniform-national-privacy-law.html. 
 149. Id.; see also 2019 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consumer-data-pri-
vacy.aspx# (last updated Jan. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Consumer Data] (indicating that in 2019, twenty-
five states and Puerto Rico introduced bills aimed at regulating the privacy practices of commercial 
cyber entities). 
 150. See MacCarthy, supra note 148; see also Consumer Data, supra note 149 (identifying twenty-
two bills, either signed or pending in California, that delineate data privacy protection standards or 
proscribed usages of data privacy by commercial cyber entities). 
 151. See MacCarthy, supra note 148.  
 152. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Keynote at the ABA 
2017 Consumer Protection Conference (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docu-
ments/public_statements/1069803/mko_aba_consumer_protection_conference.pdf (describing how 
focusing on harms can address consumer injury in cases where non-sensitive information about a con-
sumer is assembled into a sensitive mosaic about that consumer). 
 153. See id. (suggesting the FTC focus on regulating “matters where consumers are actually in-
jured” as opposed to “speculative injury”); see also Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data 
in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 501–03 (2018).  
 154. See Ohlhausen, supra note 152. 
 155. See Elvy, supra note 153, at 501–03. 
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employment decisions.156 
Liability should require a showing of actual or likely consumer injury, 
with material deception as a per se injury.157  If liability hinges on injury, many 
of the other details of privacy legislation become less important.158  Consumer 
injury should include the types of objective injury cognizable under an FTC 
unfairness analysis—primarily financial or physical harm or quantifiable in-
creased risk of harm, but also potentially extreme mental duress that results in 
tangible harms.159  If companies can be liable for other unquantifiable 
“harms,” it will be impossible to judge whether the law improves the lives of 
consumers on balance, even as it imposes costs on businesses and their cus-
tomers.160 
Clarify the application of the FTC’s unfairness and deception author-
ity, rather than mandate best practices.161  Any legislation ought to further 
detail the Section 5 approach to privacy by specifying the criteria for con-
sumer privacy injury in terms of deception and unfairness, and empowering 
the FTC to bring enforcement actions in cases where such injury occurs or is 
likely to occur.162  Penalties ought to be proportional to the harm caused or 
 
 156. See id. at 487.  
 157. See, e.g., Aspinall v. Philip Morris Co., 813 N.E.2d 476, 492 (Mass. 2004) (finding that de-
ceptive advertising constituted a per se injury if the deception caused consumers to purchase the prod-
uct). 
 158. See Ohlhausen, supra note 152 (“By focusing on practices that are actually harming or likely 
to harm consumers, the FTC can best use its limited resources.”). 
 159. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Former Comm’r, Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Painting the Privacy Land-
scape: Informational Injury in FTC Privacy and Data Security Cases (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1255113/privacy_speech_mkohlhau-
sen.pdf (explaining the various types of harm and injury that the Federal Trade Commission can ad-
dress). 
 160. See, e.g., Alec Stapp, GDPR After One Year: Costs and Unintended Consequences, TRUTH ON 
MKT. (May 24, 2019), https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/05/24/gdpr-after-one-year-costs-and-unin-
tended-consequences/ (summarizing news stories of unintended consequences and compliance costs 
of the European privacy law); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory 
of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 754–55, 769 (2018) (acknowledging that “intangible” 
injuries in the case of data breaches remain difficult to quantify). 
 161. See J. Thomas Rosch, Former Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech Before the Cal. State Bar: 
Deceptive and Unfair Acts and Practices Principles: Evolution and Convergence (May 18, 2007), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/deceptive-and-unfair-acts-and-
practices-principles-evolution-and-convergence/070518evolutionandconvergence_0.pdf. 
 162. Id.; see also BECKY CHAO, ERIC NULL & CLAIRE PARK, ENFORCING A NEW PRIVACY LAW 9 
(2019), newamerica.org/oti/reports/enforcing-new-privacy-law/ (“The FTC’s core Section 5 authority 
does not define standards for unfairness and deception.”). 
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likely to be caused, but also sufficiently high to deter problematic behavior.163 
Some might wish to simply mandate the FTC’s existing recommended 
privacy best practices.164  But doing so would lose the current focus on con-
sumer injury that directs enforcement where it matters most.165  For example, 
if legislation mandates FTC recommendations such as opt-out consent for un-
expected uses of non-sensitive data or data minimization, practices that bene-
fit consumers could still violate the law.  Such an approach would deter useful 
data-driven services and products without benefiting consumers.166 
Do not give the FTC broad rulemaking authority.167  Because privacy 
is such a multi-faceted concept, general rulemaking authority around privacy 
would be a broad delegation of legislative power that could result in adminis-
trative abuses.168  Rulemaking is a permissioned approach, like legislation—
but with less political accountability.169  To avoid potential abuse, any rule-
making authority should be targeted to specific areas, such as defining sub-
stantial consumer injury or sensitive personal information.170 
 
 163. See generally  Ginger Zhe Jin & Andrew Stivers, Protecting Consumers in Privacy and Data 
Security: A Perspective of Information Economics (May 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006172 (particularly the discussion in Section 
5 entitled “Policy Tools and their Economic Consideration”).  
 164. Jessica Rich, Give the F.T.C. Some Teeth to Guard Our Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/12/opinion/ftc-privacy-congress.html [https://nyti.ms/31FRbzP] 
(arguing that Congress should allow the FTC to set normative privacy standards for all companies 
regarding online data use and collection). 
 165. See Ohlhausen, supra note 152 (“The FTC should focus enforcement on matters where con-
sumers are injured.”). 
 166. Avi Goldfarb & Catherine E. Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising, 57(1) 
MGMT. SCI. 57, 58 (2011) (arguing that regulations restricting companies’ use of consumers’ data hin-
ders the ability to create effective online ad campaigns). 
 167. See John Hendel & Christiana Lima, FTC Chairman Tells Congress: Don’t Give Me Too Much 
Power, POLITICO (May 8, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/08/ftc-chairman-congress-
rulemaking-authority-1418237. 
 168. See Cameron F. Kerry & Daniel J. Weitzner, Rulemaking and its Discontents: Moving From 
Principle to Practice in Federal Privacy Legislation, BROOKINGS (June 5, 2019), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/06/05/rulemaking-and-its-discontents-moving-from-principle-to-prac-
tice-in-federal-privacy-legislation/; see also Ohlhausen, supra note 152 (acknowledging that although 
the “FTC must remain able to collect the information we need to enforce the law,” they must do so 
“while reducing the burden on businesses, particularly third parties who are not under investigation”).  
 169. See Kerry & Weitzner, supra note 168; see also Ohlhausen, supra note 159 (stating that case-
by-case enforcement by the FTC under Section 5 “has worked very well”). 
 170. See Ohlhausen, supra note 152 (suggesting a “harms-based” approach to privacy). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As Congress grapples with the increasing digital legibility of our world, 
it should not attempt to freeze this evolution through legislation.  Doing so 
would sacrifice the benefits of technological innovation and hinder the crea-
tion of information that helps us better understand and interact with the world 
around us.171  American privacy protections continue to evolve through tech-
nology, social norms, private arrangements, and common law.  If Congress 
seeks to legislate further privacy protections, it should preserve the environ-
ment of permissionless innovation that has made the Internet such a vital tool 
for all Americans. 
  
 
 171. See Consumer Data, supra note 149 (“Online commerce sites, social media, and mobile de-
vices and applications are becoming an integral part of consumers’ lives.  They improve consumer 
access to information and make shopping and purchases faster and easier.  Smart home speakers, in-
telligent personal assistants[,] and other connected devices extend computer networks to everyday 
items.”). 
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